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“Conscience” was an election year catchphrase. Secular and religious
businesses came forward with objections of conscience to the Affordable
Care Act’s requirement that employee health insurance plans cover
contraception. Going into the election season, some predicted that the
Obama Administration’s refusal to exempt objecting employers—with the
exception of houses of worship and a narrow array of religious
organizations—from the contraception coverage benefit would cost the
President votes among religious voters and Catholics in particular.1 In the
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1. Erik Eckholm, Both Sides Eager to Take Birth Control Coverage Issue to
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end, as an electoral matter, contraceptive coverage was much ado about
nothing. Attacks on contraception, which Americans overwhelmingly
support and use, may even have aided the Democrats.2
The controversy over conscience, however, has only just begun.
Corporations—for-profit and non-profit, religiously affiliated and secular—
have filed more than seventy lawsuits challenging the contraception
benefit.3 They claim that requiring a business to cover contraception
within a comprehensive employer-based insurance plan violates the
religious freedom of the business and its owners under the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).
I contend that a dangerous doctrine of “corporate conscience” may be
born of the contraception controversy. Already, a number of courts have
indicated a willingness to accept that artificial business entities have
religious beliefs and consciences that excuse them from compliance with
law.4 In so doing, they repudiate longstanding foundations of corporate
law. They transform conscience, which is inherently human, into the
province of business entities.
Drawing on health law and policy, I argue that in accepting these
challenges to mandated insurance benefits, courts misunderstand the nature
of health benefits and the structure of the healthcare system in two
fundamental ways. First, employee benefits are a form of compensation,
earned by and belonging to the employee like wages. By neglecting this
economic reality, courts draw incorrect conclusions about the legal and
moral responsibility of employers for the contents of their employees’

Voters,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/16/us/politics/both-sides-eager-to-take-contraception-mandate-debate-tovoters.html; Rachel Zoll, Analysis: Obama Contraceptive Mandate Has a Price,
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.businessweek.com/
ap/financialnews/D9SPU3MO1.htm.
2. Ambreen Ali, Backlash Against Birth Control Mandate Might Aid President,
CALL
(Feb.
8,
2012),
available
at
ROLL
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_92/Backlash-Against-Birth-Control-MandateMight-Aid-President-212204-1.html.
3. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, HHS Mandate Information Central,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013); Ethan
Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013,
at A1; Julie Rovner, Businesses Sue Government Over Birth Control Mandate, NPR,
Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/11/169136510/businesses-suegovernment-over-birth-control-mandate.
4. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116-17 (D.D.C.
2012).
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insurance plans and thus about the burden that any regulation imposes.
Employee use of benefits no more burdens employers than does their use of
wages. Second, the Affordable Care Act functions like other social
insurance schemes, which require the employer to play an administrative
and funding role. Courts fail to acknowledge the social insurance function
of recent health insurance reforms and, therefore, do not properly situate
contraceptive challenges within the doctrinal tradition of religious
objections to social insurance, which have typically failed.
Finally, I suggest that successful challenges to healthcare reform based
on corporate conscience would destabilize the rights of employees and of
women, in particular, beyond the context of contraception. Religiously
affiliated commercial actors already assert rights to defy health and safety
laws, pay women less, and fire pregnant women. If secular employers
succeed in their challenge to the contraception mandate, it will open the
door to their assertions of similar rights, risking gender equality and
religious freedom in all workplaces.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the contraception
benefit rule and the legal challenges to the rule from secular, for-profit
corporations. Part II identifies a number of doctrinal and theoretical
difficulties that the legal recognition of corporate conscience would create
and that courts have largely elided. Part III contends that courts have relied
on the mistaken premise that employers pay for employer-based insurance,
ignoring that employees receive benefits as a form of compensation, or
deferred wages. Part IV argues that the regulation of employer-based
insurance, including the contraceptive mandate, should be understood as
part and parcel of a comprehensive social insurance program, akin to
worker’s compensation or social security, that workers pay into in the form
of deferred wages and that employers administer. A long line of precedent
counsels skepticism toward religious objections to social insurance
schemes. Courts should evaluate the contraception challenges within this
doctrinal framework and should, accordingly, resist granting relief from the
contraception benefit rule to secular, for-profit corporations in the name of
religious freedom. Part IV warns that a doctrine of corporate conscience
would negatively affect healthcare reform and employees’ rights far
beyond contraception.
I. CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION
With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010,
Congress undertook to address the persistent problem of large numbers of
uninsured people, improve the quality of health insurance, and confront
high healthcare costs. By the time of the 2012 election, the Supreme Court
had settled the primary constitutional question around the ACA, holding
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that Congress had the authority to require individuals to carry insurance
and, under certain circumstances, to expand Medicaid.5 Nonetheless,
constitutional and statutory challenges to the ACA continue. None have
been as high profile as the claims that assert that requiring employer-based
plans to include contraception violates the Free Exercise Clause or,
somewhat more plausibly, RFRA. This Section briefly reviews the
contraception benefit rule and then describes the legal challenges it faces.
A. The Contraception Benefit Rule
In addition to expanding access to insurance, the Affordable Care Act
more comprehensively regulates health insurance at the federal level. It
prohibits all health insurance plans from imposing lifetime and annual
limits on the dollar amount of covered healthcare and from rescinding
coverage, except in cases of fraud.6 As is most relevant here, across health
plans, preventive care services must be covered without patient costsharing, that is, copayments, coinsurance, or deductibles from patients.7
With the ACA, Congress also mandated preventive care and screenings
specific to women.8 In August 2011, based on a review of evidence-based
preventive services for women’s health and well-being,9 the United States
Department of Health and Human Services issued an interim final rule
requiring insurance plans to cover contraceptives approved by the Food and
Drug Administration as part of this mandate.10 The contraception benefit
includes a range of contraceptive methods (oral contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, emergency contraception, and sterilization) and patient counseling

5. See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124

Stat. 130 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2012)) (no annual or lifetime
limits); Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 130 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12
(2012)).
7. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)).
8. Id.
9. The proposed services include counseling and screening for HIV, gestational
diabetes, and interpersonal and domestic violence. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (July 19,
2011), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/ClinicalPreventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreport
brief_updated2.pdf. All recommended preventative health services were defined as
measures “shown to improve well-being and/or decrease the likelihood or delay the
onset of a targeted disease or condition.” Id. All of the IOM’s recommendations were
subsequently incorporated into the final guidelines.
10. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed.
Reg. 46,621-01 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
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and education about these options.11
Out of sensitivity to religious concerns about contraception, the Obama
Administration proposed an initial rule that exempted those religious
employers that primarily employ and serve co-adherents.12 Modeled on
state contraceptive coverage laws in New York and California among
others, the rule would have entirely exempted those health plans
established, maintained, or provided in connection with religious
employers.13 It included no other religious accommodations.
The rule and its religious employer exemption immediately sparked
controversy. Some religiously affiliated non-profits that were not covered
by the exemption, such as universities, hospitals, social service providers,
and insurance companies, characterized the rule as an affront to religious
liberty.14 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops insisted that the rule
drew “a new distinction—alien to both [the] Catholic tradition and to
federal law—between our houses of worship and our great ministries of
service to our neighbors, namely, the poor, the homeless, the sick, the
students in our schools and universities and others in need, of any faith
community or none.”15 After sustained outcry, the Obama Administration
announced a one-year safe harbor for religiously affiliated non-profits in
order to develop a broader accommodation.16
11. Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines,
HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited
June 19, 2013); see also FDA OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, Birth Control: Medicines
to Help You, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/Free
Publications/ucm313215.htm (last visited June 19, 2013).
12. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed.
Reg. 46,621-01.
13. Insurance Coverage for Contraception Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurancecoverage-for-contraception-state-laws.aspx.
14. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 8725-01, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (“These
commenters included some religiously-affiliated educational institutions, healthcare
organizations, and charities. Some . . . expressed concerns about paying for such
services and stated that doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs.”).
15. United for Religious Freedom, ADMIN. COMM. OF THE U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religiousliberty/march-14-statement-on-religious-freedom-and-hhs-mandate.cfm.
16. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Women’s Preventive Services and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-spreventive-services-and-religious-institutions.
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In February 2013, the Administration proposed a new rule.17 The rule
continues to exempt “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions
or associations of churches, as well as the exclusively religious activities of
any religious order.”18 It also, however, accommodates a wide array of
non-profit religious organizations, including hospitals and educational
institutions.19 Under the rule, they may exclude contraceptive coverage
from their employees’ insurance plans. They need not be involved in
“contracting, arranging, paying, or referring for [contraception]
Their employees, however, will still have access to
coverage.”20
contraceptive coverage.21 The obligation will fall on the employer’s
insurance company to provide contraceptive coverage directly to
employees (and their families for family plans) at no cost.22 A final rule
implementing these accommodations was released in June of 2013.23
As the rule makes clear, a wide berth has been given to religious mores
related to contraception. Like other areas of statutory law, the scheme of
accommodation draws lines based on both the religious aspects and the
commercial nature of the employer.24 Religious employers are exempted
entirely; their employees need not have access to coverage for
contraception. Religiously affiliated non-profit employers may exclude
contraception from the plans they contract for or pay into, but their
17. Coverage of Preventive Services Under Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013).
18. Id. at 8461 (proposing to exempt an employer that is organized and operates as
a nonprofit entity and referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code, which refers to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions
or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any
religious order).
19. Id. at 8462.
20. Id. The proposed rule achieves these same goals for self-insured non-profit
religious employers as well. Id. at 8463-64. Under the proposed rule, the employees of
a non-profit religious employer will be able to access a third party insurance plan just
for contraception coverage at no cost to them. The third party insurance providers will
be able to offset their additional costs by claiming an adjustment in Federallyfacilitated Exchange user fees.
21. Id. at 8462.
22. Id. at 8465.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Administration Issues Final
Rules on Contraception Coverage and Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/06/20130628a.html.
24. See, e.g., SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD RELIGIOUS INSTS. PRACTICE GRP.,
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE, available at
http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/final_religious%20institutions%20practice
%20group.pdf (last visited June 19, 2013) (discussing religious employer exceptions to
state employment anti-discrimination laws).
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employees will have access under a separate policy provided by the
insurance company or, if the employer self-insures, by a third-party
administrator.
Finally, secular companies must comply with the
contraception benefit; they may not employ religion as a shield.
B. Legal Challenges to the Contraception Benefit
In response to the proposed contraception rule, corporations—for-profit
and non-profit, religiously affiliated and secular—have filed over seventy
lawsuits.25 They claim, among other things, that the benefit violates their
constitutional rights to free exercise, speech, and association.26 Primarily,
however, they rely on RFRA.27 RFRA establishes that, even with regard to
a rule of general applicability, the federal government may only
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion when the burden (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.28
Thus, the initial question before courts is whether a corporation (or its
shareholders on behalf of the corporation) can exercise religious freedom
and bring a claim under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause. If so, courts
must consider whether the burden of the contraception benefit is
substantial, and, if so, whether it can be justified as the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling government interest.
Given the safe harbor for religiously affiliated organizations, courts have
almost uniformly dismissed claims by universities, dioceses, and other
religious non-profits for lack of standing and ripeness.29 Now, despite the
accommodation granted to them, some religiously affiliated non-profit
organizations have filed new suits—arguing that when the insurer
separately contracts with an employer’s employees to cover contraception
at no charge, contraceptive coverage remains part of the employer’s plan
and is financed by it.30 The requirement to show that the law’s burden on
25. See, e.g., Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 3.
26. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (W.D. Okla.

2012).
27. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a)-(b).
29. See, e.g., Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440,
2013 WL 1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing for lack of ripeness);
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2013)
(dismissing for lack of ripeness and lack of standing). But see Geneva Coll. v.
Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 3071481 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (granting an
injunction in favor of a religious organization admittedly covered by the proposed
accommodation).
30. Bethany Monk, Take Action: American Family Association Files Lawsuit
Against
HHS
Mandate,
CITIZENLINK
(Feb.
25,
2013),
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their religious freedom is substantial, however, is likely insurmountable for
this category of plaintiff.
The accommodation effectively allows
employers to avoid all but a de minimis connection to the alleged
wrongdoing.
Employers’ contracted-for plans will not include
contraception. Nor will employers pay for the additional coverage since
the contraception benefit is at worst cost-neutral.31 That is, a plan that
covers contraception will not result in higher premiums and may in fact
reduce overall plan costs.32 Given the insubstantiality of any burden, courts
should continue to dismiss these claims.
The bulk of the litigation has focused, not on religiously affiliated
employers, but on secular, for-profit corporations. To be clear, the
contraceptive challengers are not mom and pop shops. Because the ACA
only applies to large employers, they are, by definition, large employers of
fifty or more full-time employees. They range from food processing
companies with 400 employees33 to craft stores with 13,000 employees.34
Some employers challenge the full scope of the contraception benefit,
including oral contraceptives and sterilization.35 Others accept the moral
permissibility of contraception generally, but claim that emergency
contraception, such as Plan B, is an abortifacient.36
Advocacy
organizations, such as the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty, often represent these companies in court.37 In
similar fashion, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops continues to
criticize the proposed rule for refusing “to acknowledge conscience rights
of business owners who operate their businesses according to their faith
http://www.citizenlink.com/2013/02/25/take-action-american-family-association-fileslawsuit-against-hhs-mandate/ (“The new proposed HHS rule misleads faith-based
groups and all Americans into believing they will no longer have to violate their faith
and provide objectionable insurance for birth control and abortion-inducing drugs.”).
31. Alex Wayne, Critics Want More Exemptions from U.S. Birth-Control Rule,
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-0201/religious-nonprofits-won-t-pay-for-birth-control-u-dot-s-dot-says.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF, THE COST OF
COVERING CONTRACEPTIVES THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE 1-2 (Feb. 2012),
http:///aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/contraceptives/ib.shtml.
33. Gilardi v. Sebelius, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 781150, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3,
2013).
34. Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
35. See, e.g., Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *2.
36. See, e.g., Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2012).
37. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 3; Legal Actions
Against
Obamacare,
ALLIANCE
DEFENDING
FREEDOM,
http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/page/ObamaCare/learn-more (last visited
June 19, 2013).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/4

8

Sepper: Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience

2014]

THE BIRTH OF CORPORATE CONSCIENCE

311

and moral values.”38
The argument made by for-profit employers boils down to this: the
Affordable Care Act forces the employer to provide insurance coverage
and to pay, through its insurance plan, for healthcare (in this case
contraception) to which it objects as a matter of religion. Challengers
argue that “they face a stark dilemma: either comply with the contraceptive
coverage requirement, and violate their religious convictions, or refuse to
comply, and face ruinous penalties.”39 The lawsuits assert two theories:
(1) the corporation exercises religion as an independent legal entity, and (2)
shareholders use the corporation as an instrument to express their own
beliefs, such that the corporation is indistinguishable from its owners. As
RFRA requires, plaintiff corporations and shareholders contend that their
exercise of religion is substantially burdened because “they must facilitate,
subsidize, and encourage the use of goods and services that they sincerely
believe are immoral or suffer severe penalties.”40 They further claim that
the government has no compelling interest in ensuring that health plans
include contraceptive coverage.41 Finally, they argue, the regulation of
employer-based plans is not the least restrictive means to achieve any
compelling interest.42
Courts have considered dozens of motions for preliminary injunctions
from these for-profit, secular corporations.43 Thus far, in the majority of
cases, courts have held that secular, for-profit corporations (or their
owners) are likely to succeed on the merits of their religious freedom
claims and have enjoined operation of the contraception benefit against
them.44 A circuit split has emerged between the Seventh, Tenth, and D.C.
38. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, HHS Proposal Falls Short
in Meeting Church Concerns; Bishops Look Forward to Addressing Issues with
Administration (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm.
39. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012).
40. Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *4. For a list of some of the for-profit companies
challenging the contraceptive coverage mandate, see Katie J.M. Baker, Meet the 18
For-Profit Companies Fighting Obamacare’s Contraception Coverage, JEZEBEL (Feb.
7, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://jezebel.com/5982261/meet-the-12-for+profit-companiesagainst-obamacares-contraception-coverage?tag=pill-baby-pill.
41. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
42. Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 995; Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287,
1298 (D. Colo. 2012).
43. Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 838238, at *10 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 6, 2013).
44. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, Nos. 12-3841 & 13-1077, 2013 WL 5, at *2 (7th
Cir. Nov. 8, 2013); Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1294; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
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Circuits, which have sided with challengers, and the Third and Sixth
Circuits, which have refused to enjoin the contraception benefit.45
Generally speaking, courts granting preliminary injunctions to
contraceptive challengers reason as follows. First, they admit the difficulty
of finding that a for-profit company itself exercises religion. Some cite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission46 as potential support for the “independent First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion” of a for-profit company that, for example,
sells power system equipment.47 Alternatively, courts decline to determine
that corporations have rights under the First Amendment or RFRA but,
through judicial sleight of hand, find that a corporation and its owners are
coextensive.48 For example, regarding a for-profit corporation that
publishes religious books and Bibles, one court said, “[W]hen the beliefs of
a closely-held corporation and its owners are inseparable, the corporation
should be deemed the alter-ego of its owners for religious purposes.”49
Having announced that the corporation is an embodiment of the owner and
her beliefs, these courts decide that requiring the corporation to cover
contraception or face financial consequences constitutes a substantial
burden on the religious freedom of the owners of the corporation.50
45. Korte, 2013 WL 6757353, at *2; Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL 5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Autocam Corp. v.
Sebelius, No. 12-2673, 2013 WL 5182544 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2013); Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13-1144, 2013 WL
3845365 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013); Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302.
46. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
47. Beckwith Elec. Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL
3297498, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013) (“[T]here is nothing to suggest that the right
to exercise religion, which immediately precedes the right to free speech in the First
Amendment, was intended to treat any form of the ‘corporate personhood,’ including
corporations, sole proprietorships and partnerships, any differently than it treats
individuals. To write into the text of the First Amendment such a distinction,
especially when there seems to be no evidence that such a distinction mattered to the
Framers, would seem to be in conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Citizens
United.”); see also Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3. Contra Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 2013 WL
1277419, No. 5-12-cv-06744 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) (concluding that secular, for-profit
corporations do not have free exercise rights).
48. Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (finding that corporate form is not dispositive
because the individual plaintiffs would violate their religious beliefs if the corporation
had to comply with the mandate); Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL
1014026, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar.14, 2013) (adopting the alter ego theory).
49. Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 2012).
50. Id. (“[C]ourts must consider the rights of the owners as the basis for the [f]ree
[e]xercise claim brought by the corporation, even if the regulation technically applies
only to the corporation.”) (emphasis in original).
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Finally, some courts express skepticism that the government has
compelling interests in expanding access to contraception;51 others
conclude that the government has not shown the contraception benefit rule
is the least restrictive means to accomplish the interests.52 Instead, they
say, the government could directly fund and provide contraception itself.53
By contrast, other courts have refused to enjoin the contraception benefit
with regard to private corporations.54 They answer the question of whether
any secular, for-profit corporation can exercise religion in the negative.55
For example, the Gilardi v. Sebelius district court determined that secular
companies “are engaged in purely commercial conduct and do not exercise
religion.”56
51. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013
WL 5854246, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013) (“‘[S]afeguarding public health’ seems
too broadly formulated to satisfy the compelling interest test.”); Beckwith Elec. Co.,
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, at *17 (M.D. Fla.
June 25, 2013) (“The Court is not particularly persuaded by the government’s evidence
to support its compelling interest. For example, there is no empirical data or other
evidence . . . that would support the conclusion that the provision of the FDA-approved
emergency contraceptives (in addition to the contraceptives to which plaintiffs do not
object) would result in fewer unintended pregnancies.”).
52. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting an injunction
for a privately held and family run company with 1,148 full time employees engaged in
the manufacturing vehicle safety systems in large part because the government “has not
demonstrated that requiring religious objectors to provide cost free contraception
coverage is the least restrictive means of increasing access to contraception”).
53. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298-99 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding
that the government will need to disprove that “government provision of free birth
control” is an alternative).
54. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa.
2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-00285-WYD-BNB, 2013 WL 755413 (D. Colo.
Feb. 27, 2013); Gilardi v. Sebelius, No. 13-104, 2013 WL 781150 (D.D.C. Mar. 3,
2013), rev’d Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL
5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1677, 2013
WL 5745858 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2013); MK Chambers Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., No. 13-11379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47887 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3,
2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 24, 2012); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d
1149, 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
55. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Serv., 2013 WL 1277419, No. 5-12-cv-06744 (3d Cir. Feb. 8,
2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00285, 2013 WL 755413, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb.
27, 2013).
56. Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *7, rev’d Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 2013 WL 5854246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Autocam,
2012 WL 6845677, at *4 (expressing skepticism at the possibility that for-profit
corporations could exercise religion without deciding).
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Nor do these courts accept the argument that the shareholders’ beliefs
can be imputed to the corporation. They reason that it is well-established
in corporate law that the corporation is not equivalent to its owners. One
district court observed that:
[t]he mandate does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do
anything. They do not have to use or buy contraceptives for themselves
or anyone else. It is only the legally separate entities they currently own
that have any obligation under the mandate. The law protects that
separation between the corporation and its owners.57

These courts conclude that it is the corporation, not the owners, that
sponsors a health plan (itself a distinct legal entity) and bears the burden of
ACA regulations.58 They further decide that any burden on the owners’
free exercise is attenuated—separated from the contested act by the
corporate form in the first instance and by the autonomous decision of the
employee in the second.59 Even assuming a substantial burden on the
owners (or corporate entity), these courts hold that the government has
compelling interests in the contraception benefit and is not required to set
up a government-provided and funded contraception system to meet
them.60
At heart, federal courts manifest a fundamental disagreement over
whether a for-profit corporation can exercise religion, either as a
constitutional or statutory matter. They further diverge over whether
shareholders can employ the corporate form to exercise their own religious

57. Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7; see also Gilardi, 2013 WL 781150, at *9
(“[T]he regulations are imposed on the . . . corporations, not the owners, and the
corporate form cannot be disregarded on the ground that the corporations are the
owners’ ‘alter egos,’ such that any burden is indirect.”); Grote, 708 F.3d at 858
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[S]o long as the business’s liabilities are not the
[shareholders’] liabilities—which is the primary and ‘invaluable privilege’ conferred
by the corporate form—neither are the business’s expenditures the [shareholders’] own
expenditures.”).
58. Grote, 708 F.3d at 857 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 858; see also Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (“[T]he particular
burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute to a
group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by healthcare
providers and patients covered by the plan, subsidize someone else’s participation in an
activity that is condemned by plaintiffs’ religion.”); Conestoga, 2013 WL 140110, at
*414-15 (noting that “[a] series of events must first occur before the actual use of an
abortifacient would come into play”).
60. See, e.g., Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(“Plaintiffs’ alternative prospect of establishing a separate agency whose purpose
would be to provide contraception to women raises a host of administrative and
logistical problems, well pointed-out by the Government’s response, and does not
appear practical.”).
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beliefs, essentially piercing the corporate veil when it is in the
shareholders’ own interest. Ultimately, decisions on the contraception
benefit expose a fundamental split over central questions of religious
liberty and the role of the corporation in our society.
II. THE BIRTH OF A DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE CONSCIENCE?
In the contraception context, claims of corporate free exercise are
coming fast and furious. I suggest that we may be witnessing the birth of a
doctrine of “corporate conscience.” In this Part, I raise some concerns
about what such a doctrine might mean.
Faced with contraceptive challenges, several courts now hold that a
secular, for-profit corporation has a right to exercise religion under the Free
Exercise Clause and RFRA, entitling it to exemptions from business
regulation.61 Many more dodge the ultimate question of whether
corporations themselves can exercise religion, but indicate a willingness to
accept that artificial business entities have religious beliefs and consciences
that excuse them from compliance with law.62 In so doing, these courts
seem receptive to an unprecedented expansion of corporate personhood that
pushes the limits of recent jurisprudential shifts toward increased
institutional freedoms, as in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.63 Just as Citizens United’s establishment of a constitutional
right to corporate political speech raised a host of thorny questions64
(although that context at least involved the prior existence of corporate
speech), so too would “corporate conscience” present perplexing legal and
philosophical questions. How can a business have beliefs, religious or
otherwise? What does it mean for a business to hold a faith? How, as
courts now ponder, can a corporation exercise religion?65 How does it
show sincerity? Can a single-minded obligation to maximize profits meld
61. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302; Korte v. Sebelius, Nos. 12-3841 &
13-1077, 2013 WL 5, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2013); Beckwith Elec. Co., Inc. v.
Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013).
62. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *3-6
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013); Tyndale v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C.
2012).
63. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
64. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 86 (2010) (raising a number of these questions that
arise because a “corporation, after all, is not a natural, Platonic entity” but a “legal
arrangement”).
65. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012);
Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677, at *4 (observing that “[a] corporation cannot, for
example, attend worship services or otherwise participate in the sacraments and rites of
the church, as individuals do”).
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with religious devotion?
The federal judiciary’s receptiveness to religious freedom for the forprofit business community is unprecedented. Although corporations have
some constitutional rights, their rights are not coextensive with those of
individuals.66 In starkly rejecting corporate Free Exercise, one court
explained, “[R]eligious belief takes shape within the minds and hearts of
individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights
provided by the Constitution.”67 Nor do corporations necessarily have the
same statutory rights that individuals do.68 RFRA extends protection to
“persons,” which could be read to apply to artificial persons.69 But the
statute was intended to restore the constitutional strict scrutiny standard for
review of religious liberty claims that the Supreme Court rejected in
Employment Division v. Smith,70 rather than expand religious liberty to forprofit businesses.71 Ultimately, protecting corporate free exercise—
whether directly from the corporation or indirectly from shareholders—
runs counter to our intuitions that individual claims of conscience are
66. For instance, corporations do not have a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 5 (1970). With regard to the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has determined that “[w]hile they may and
should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public
investigation . . . corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment
of a right to privacy.” U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950).
67. Conestoga, 2013 WL 140110, at *7.
68. See, e.g., Fed. Comm. Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1177 (2011)
(holding that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy for purposes of the
Freedom of Information Act).
69. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993)
(“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”).
70. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990) (holding that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)’”).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)-1 (stating that purpose of RFRA is “to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9;
H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 5-6 (1993); 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1898 (“This bill is not a
codification of the result reached in any prior free exercise decision but rather the
restoration of the legal standard that was applied in those decisions. Therefore, the
compelling interest test generally should not be construed more stringently or more
leniently than it was prior to Smith.”).
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morally superior to those of institutional structures. In our pluralist society,
this is often the way the law approaches issues of conviction—for example,
allowing individuals, but rarely institutions, to discriminate.72
In addition to equating the institution to the individual, the new corporate
conscience would tear apart the distinction that constitutional and statutory
law has drawn between secular for-profits and religious commercial
organizations.73 Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC seems to put institutional interests over
individual rights, the decision still distinguishes between churches and
secular entities.74 Moreover, even religiously affiliated organizations are
not generally entitled to defy employment-related laws on the ground of
free exercise; only in certain circumstances may they discriminate in favor
of co-adherents of their faith.75
Treating corporate free exercise as derivative of the owners’ beliefs does
not solidify the doctrinal move toward for-profit conscience. Corporations,
as conglomerate entities, exist indefinitely and independently of their
shareholders.76 They carry out acts and affect individual lives, and have an
72. Michael A. Rie, Defining the Limits of Institutional Moral Agency in Health
Care: A Response to Kevin Wildes, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 221, 223 (1991).
73. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2010) (allowing religious organizations to
“give employment preference to members of their own religion” as an accommodation
to Title VII); Kelly Catherine Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States,
100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789-90 (2012) (“States that currently have such [sexual
orientation antidiscrimination] statutes generally have minimal religious exemptions . .
. . These include exemptions for actual places of religious worship, the organizations
they operate, and certain private organizations.”).
74. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 699 (2012) (“The question presented is whether the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when the employer is a
religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”) (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378
(1990) (state sales and use taxes); Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
(federal wage and overtime recordkeeping requirements); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (social security); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627
(7th Cir. 2000) (unemployment tax systems); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian School,
781 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (“While . . . religious institutions may base
relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, religious employers are not
immune from liability [under Title VII] for discrimination based on . . . sex.
Furthermore, Congress and this court have specifically rejected proposals that provide
religious employers a complete exemption from regulation under the [Civil Rights] Act
[of 1964].”); St. John’s Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271,
1271 (Mont. 1992) (workers’ compensation laws); Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 442 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
76. Peter A. French, Collective Responsibility and the Practice of Medicine, 7 J. OF
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identity that is larger than their constituent parts. Walmart is Walmart,
even when Sam Walton resigns.77 The very goal of the corporate form is to
separate the person from the entity, shielding the person from obligation
and liability and ensuring that the entity focuses on profit maximization.78
As the Supreme Court has noted, “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create
a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges
different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it,
or whom it employs.”79
While corporate law makes clear that corporations and their shareholders
are separate entities, in the current context courts advance a concept of the
corporation as a means by which individuals express moral judgments
about contraception. Individuals, as the argument goes, recognize that their
religious beliefs may be best carried out through the corporate form, such
that any regulation of a corporation represents a potential burden on the
religious exercise by its shareholders.
This “corporation as shareholder alter ego” rationale deals a blow to the
separateness of corporations in corporate law doctrine. As the Conestoga
Woods court said, “[t]he owners of an LLC or corporation, even a closelyheld one, have an obligation to respect the corporate form, on pain of losing
the benefits of that form should they fail to do so. The fact that one person
owns all of the stock does not make him and the corporation one and the
same person, nor does he thereby become the owner of all the property of
the corporation. [Conestoga’s owners] chose to incorporate and conduct
business through Conestoga, thereby obtaining both the advantages and
disadvantages of the corporate form.”80 Allowing owners to subvert the
corporate form, by contrast, represents an enormous shift in corporate law.
Even if the doctrine were limited to closely held or privately held
MED. & PHIL. 65, 72-75 (1982).
77. Id. at 74-75.
78. Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (concluding
that under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the president and
sole shareholder of a corporation is not the same person as the corporation and making
the point that “linguistically speaking” and as a matter of corporate law “[t]he corporate
owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally
different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal
status”).
79. Id. at 163.
80. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013); Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir.
2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Grotes are not at liberty to treat the company’s
bank accounts as their own; co-mingling personal and corporate funds is a classic sign
that a company owner is disregarding the corporate form and treating the business as
his alter ego.”).
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corporations, between eighty percent and ninety percent of companies fall
into this category; they employ sixty-two percent of all employees.81
The alter ego notion generates further practical and doctrinal
complexities. Presuming the shareholders or owners share the same
position on contraception use, they may not do so on all issues. Even
adherents of the same religion often disagree over the application of
universal rules in specific cases. Indeed, identifying the institutional
position on moral questions can be difficult in those religious institutions
with hierarchical structures, let alone in pluralistic, profit-seeking
commercial entities.82 In the case of disagreeing shareholders, whose
beliefs matter? And what of employees who may not share the owners’
beliefs?
Exempting employers from the contraception mandate (or other social
insurance) would permit corporate owners to interfere with their
employees’ varied religious beliefs. Solely because they own capital, a
small minority of people could effectively block access to insurance
coverage for contraception, or any other healthcare it deems objectionable,
for a majority of employees. Some owners, such as those of the HVAC
manufacturing company Hercules, suggest that their company is openly
religious, and its perspective does not unfairly surprise its employees.83 In
this sense, they characterize the employer-employee relationship as a
voluntary association. If, however, the employees truly do share in the
company’s values, then the burden of covering contraception would be
non-existent. Only theoretically would the insurance plan be used to
purchase contraception; in practice, the employees would never use it in
such a way, because they share their employer’s beliefs. The employer
could contract for and finance a health insurance plan that covers
contraception without any risk of moral wrongdoing at all.
These difficult corporate, religious freedom, and employment law
questions arise with respect to any doctrine of corporate conscience. Yet,
courts have not fully considered the wide-ranging effects of this shift across

81. WILLIAM PATTERSON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES,
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES, available at
www.wpunj.edu/CloselyHeld/EconomicImpact.dot (last visited March 27, 2013).
82. See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage
L.J
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
Debates,
89
IND.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279040 (analyzing conflict within Catholic Charities of
Boston over placement of children with gay foster parents); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking
Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1543 (2012) (discussing instances of
disagreement between religious officials within the same religion over the morality of
medical care).
83. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012).
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doctrines. Just as significantly, courts have based their decisions on a
misunderstanding of the employer’s role in the healthcare system and the
government interests at stake, which the next sections take up.
III. MISUNDERSTANDING THE WAGE-HEALTH INSURANCE TRADE OFF AND
THE INSUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF INSURANCE REGULATION
When granting injunctions against the contraception benefit, courts
typically ignore the economic reality that employee benefits are a form of
compensation, like wages earned by and belonging to the employee. They
thus overstate the economic burden on employees and, in turn,
misunderstand the religious freedom analysis. If, as is generally agreed,
employees’ use of wages to purchase products of which their employers
disapprove cannot constitute a substantial burden on the employer’s
religion, their use of benefits is similarly insubstantial. By failing to
identify the tradeoff between wages and benefits in employee
compensation, courts incorrectly conclude that employers bear
responsibility, legal and moral, for the contents of their employees’
insurance plans and consequently are burdened by regulation.
Challengers argue that the contraceptive mandate forces them, and/or the
corporation they own, “to pay for, provide, facilitate, or otherwise support
contraception.”84 These concerns range from the immediate to the mediate
to the highly attenuated (the use of, purchase of, contracting for a plan that
covers, and offering a plan that covers contraception). Although the
Seventh Circuit described the burden as “the coerced coverage of
contraception, abortifacients, sterilization, and related services, not—or
perhaps more precisely, not only—in the later purchase or use of
contraception or related services,”85 this description cannot be quite
accurate. Having a plan that covers contraception but will never be used
for contraception, such that no wrongdoing ever occurs, cannot impose a
substantial burden on religious freedom. Instead, although there is some
fluidity in their objections, challengers seem most concerned with the risk
that the plan will be used to purchase contraception.
Irrespective of how these claims are understood, any inquiry into the
burden of contraceptive coverage on the employer should consider the
nature of employee benefits generally and health insurance specifically. A
closer examination of employee benefits helps clarify the burden that
regulating those benefits might impose and puts into perspective the

84. Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 14, 2013).
85. Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
2012).
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employer’s responsibility for, or link to, the objectionable act—in this case,
the purchase or use of contraception.
Economic theory and empirical work instructs that employees earn a
total package of compensation that includes wages and benefits, ranging
from vacation days to worker’s compensation.86 Workers trade off wages
for benefits, preferring different wage-benefit mixes depending on age,
health status, and other individual factors.87 The wage-insurance tradeoff,
also known as the “compensating wage theory,” predicts a proportionate
and inverse relationship between wages and health benefits.88 Therefore, as
courts have observed, depriving workers of employee benefits amounts to
reducing their pay.89
Employer-based health insurance is no different. Workers earn benefits
and wages that together constitute a total compensation package. Since
2013, employees’ W-2s have made this clear: the total annual premium
paid toward health insurance and wages are reported.90
Workers’ wages fall as the employer’s health insurance expenditures
rise. Indeed, rising healthcare costs are widely viewed as the primary
driver of flat—or decreasing—real wages for employees in the United
States.91 As one CEO explained recently in the pages of the New York

86. See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing Differences, in
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 641 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard, eds.
1986); Walter W. Kolodrubetz, Two Decades of Employee Benefit Plans, 1950-1970: A
Review, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 10 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Richard D. Miller Jr., Estimating the Compensating Differential for
Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECON. 27,
27 (2004) (finding a compensating differential for health insurance equal to 10% to
11% of wages); Bradley R. Schiller & Randall D. Weiss, Pensions and Wages: A Test
for Equalizing Differences, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 529 (1980) (finding wage tradeoff
for pension plans); Stephen A. Woodbury, Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage
Benefits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 166, 166 (1983) (showing that young workers, age 16-34,
receive a higher percentage of salary versus nonwage benefits).
88. See generally Craig A. Olson, Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange
for Health Benefits?, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 91, 91 (2002) (“Holding human capital and
other variables influencing wages constant, workers who receive more generous fringe
benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe
benefits.”).
89. When considering the denial of spousal benefits to same-sex domestic
partners, the Alaska Supreme Court framed the issue as whether one group of workers
could be paid less than their similarly situated co-workers. Alaska Civil Liberties
Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2005).
90. 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a)(14) (2012).
91. David Leonhardt, How a Tax Can Cut Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/.2009/09/30/business/economy/30leonhardt.html; Paul
van de Water, Excise Tax on Very High Cost Plans Is a Sound Element of Health
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Times, his company pays thousands of dollars in an employee’s healthcare
costs that might otherwise go to her salary; he continued, “From my point
of view as a chief executive of a company, healthcare is just a different
form of compensation.”92
Although researchers disagree on the magnitude of this trade-off, studies
confirm a negative relationship between wages and benefits.93 As is
particularly relevant, a study of Massachusetts’ health insurance reform,
which the ACA largely mirrors, uncovered an almost dollar-for-dollar
relationship between the cost of health benefits to the employer and the
corresponding fall in wages.94 Employees paid almost the full cost of
health insurance through lower wages (or an average of $6,058 less, nearly
exactly the cost of annual health insurance premiums).95
The origins of employer-based health insurance further confirm that it
serves as compensation. During World War II, employers faced a shortage
of workers and a federal freeze on wages.96 With benefits exempted from
the definition of wages by the War Labor Board, for the first time on a
grand scale companies began to offer their employees health insurance in
order to increase total compensation.97 During and immediately after
World War II, enrollment in private health insurance skyrocketed.98
Employers’ role in the healthcare system was cemented by the continued
Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2957.
92. David Goldhill, Op-Ed, The Health Benefits That Cut Your Pay, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/opinion/sunday/the-healthbenefits-that-cut-your-pay.html.
93. See, e.g., Craig A. Olson, Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange for
Health Benefits?, 20 J. LABOR ECON. 91, 93 (2002) (finding that the average married
woman who moved from a job without health benefits to a job with health benefits
accepted a wage reduction of about 20 percent); Miller Jr., supra note 87, at 27
(reporting that male workers between 25 and 55 who lost their employer-sponsored
health benefits were compensated with roughly a 10 to 11 percent increase in wages).
94. Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda E. Kowalski, Mandate-Based Health Reforms
and the Labor Market: Evidence From the Massachusetts Reform, 26 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper 17933, Mar. 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17933.pdf?new_window=1.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century
Development of U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 240
(2002).
97. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 311
(1982) (describing employer-based insurance as “a functional substitute for social
insurance, which is built on employee relations for much the same reasons” (reduction
of administrative expense and focus on healthy)).
98. Id. at 313.
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preferential tax treatment of health insurance.99 Unlike wages on which
employees pay taxes, employer-based health insurance is free of income
taxes and subject to reduced payroll taxes.100
Therefore, each employee’s actual “salary” is wages plus the employer
share of the health insurance premium. That employers provide the
structure through which financing is delivered does not change the fact that
employees, not employers, ultimately pay for health insurance premiums.
At present, employees who receive health insurance through work pay an
average of 8.6% of their gross income for that insurance, primarily in the
form of foregone wages.101 Employees also pay a portion of health
insurance premiums directly, essentially moving additional compensation
from wages to benefits.102 Some plans even involve health savings
accounts, which allow employees to direct a portion of pre-tax wages to
pay for healthcare not covered by their insurance.103
Why does the wage-benefit tradeoff matter for analysis of free exercise
claims? The law does not accommodate every assertion of religious
liberty, but rather evaluates burdens along a scale between directness and
attenuation. Plaintiffs in the contraception litigation acknowledge that their
employees’ purchase of contraception with wages does not represent a
burden on the employers’ free exercise.104 The burden on either the
99. Thomas Bodenheimer et al., How Large Employers Are Shaping the Health
Care Marketplace: First of Two Parts, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003, 1003 (1998);
David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance,
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001).
100. Peter Wiedenbeck, Taxes and Healthcare, 124 TAX NOTES 889, 891-92 (2009)
(noting that employer payments under a plan are exempt from Social Security and
Medicare taxes); I.R.C. § 106 (1958) (“Gross income does not include contributions by
the employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or
otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness.”); see also BOB LYKE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767, THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMP’R-PROVIDED
HEALTH INS.: POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 3, 7-9 (2008).
101. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1617 n.176 (2011).
102. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: 2011 Survey Results, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH
AND
QUALITY,
available
at
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?component=2&subc
omponent=1&year=2011&tableSeries=-1&tableSubSeries=&searchText=&searchMeth
od=1&Action=Search (last visited June 21, 2013) (Tables I.C.1, I.C.2, I.D.1, I.D.2).
103. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012).
104. Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs do not seek to control what an employee or his or her
dependents do with the wages and healthcare dollars we provide. Our employees are
free to make decisions with their money—including the funds in their personal health
savings account—that we do not agree with.”).
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corporation or its owners is too attenuated, irrespective of how morally
reprehensible the employer finds the employees’ purchases.
The
employer’s role is delinked by virtue of the employee’s decision about how
to use the wages.
Benefits function in much the same way. In evaluating the effect of the
contraceptive mandate on free exercise, as Judge Rovner of the Seventh
Circuit said, “it is worth considering whether the burden is different in kind
from the burden of knowing that an employee might be using his or her []
paycheck (or money in a healthcare reimbursement account) to pay for
contraception him or herself.”105 Courts that have rejected challenges to
the contraception benefit have recognized that benefits and wages have
“virtually no functional difference” and “involve the same economic
exchange at the corporate level: employees will earn a wage or benefit
with their labor, and money originating from [the employer] will pay for
it.”106 When a corporation purchases a health insurance plan that its
employees (and their family members) may or may not use to buy
contraception, it no more pays for contraception than it does when
employees use their wages to buy it. Unless how employees spend their
wages also burdens an employer’s liberty, how employees use their
insurance benefits must be similarly insubstantial.
One might nonetheless argue that wages do not require employers to
structure and contract for coverage the way health insurance does. As the
next section shows, our social insurance system regularly relies on
employers to take on an administrative and contributory role, irrespective
of their religious objections.
IV. SITUATING THE CONTRACEPTIVE LITIGATION WITHIN THE DOCTRINAL
FRAMEWORK OF FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL INSURANCE
Religious challenges to the contraception benefit take place within the
context of healthcare reform and, more broadly, our social insurance
system. The Affordable Care Act aims to establish near-universal access to
a baseline of affordable and adequate coverage. Preventive services
function as an important component of insurance access and populationwide health promotion. Yet, as a basic overview of the health insurance
105. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 861 (7th Cir. 2013).
106. Autocam Corp., 2012 WL 6845677, at *6 (“[I]n neither situation do the wages

and benefits earned pay—directly or indirectly—for contraception products and
services unless an employee makes an entirely independent decision to purchase
them.”); see also Grote, 708 F.3d at 861 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (“[C]onsider that
health insurance is an element of employee compensation. How an employee
independently chooses to use that insurance arguably may be no different in kind from
the ways in which she decides to spend her take-home pay.”).
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system demonstrates, courts have failed to recognize the similarity of the
contraceptive challenges to previous objections to social insurance
schemes.
Part A argues that the role the ACA ascribes to private employers bears
striking resemblance to other comprehensive social insurance schemes, all
of which have faced and survived challenges based on free exercise. Like
other social insurance, employer-based insurance is dependent on
government support, enforced through the tax system, and administered
and financed through employers. Based on this analysis, as Part B shows,
challenges to the regulation and structure of employer-based insurance—
including the current contraceptive challenges—should be analyzed within
the doctrinal framework of previous religious objections to social
insurance. Part C applies this framework in light of the government’s
compelling interests in comprehensive insurance, public health, gender
equality, and religious freedom.
A. Employer-Sponsored Insurance as Social Insurance
Characterizing employer-sponsored insurance as part of a social
insurance system—like social security insurance, workers’ compensation
insurance, and unemployment insurance—makes sense if we look at how it
is structured. After the implementation of the ACA, employment-based
insurance will function as a key part of a system of national health
insurance. Its regulation serves to improve coverage, both qualitatively (as,
for instance, requiring preventive services) and quantitatively (expanding
the pool of insured). Like other social insurance systems, health insurance
requires employers to administrate funding, contribute a share, and
constitute a mechanism through which employees pay in. As with social
security, workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance, employees
ultimately make the entirety of the premium payment in the form of
deferred wages. Like other social insurance obligations, the employer’s
duty to offer ACA-compliant insurance is implemented through the tax
system. Extensive government financing further shores up government
interests in ensuring that employer-based insurance meets minimum
standards.
The U.S. health system today is fragmented across public and private
programs with varying levels of coverage, care, and cost. Approximately
fifty-five percent of people (or 169.3 million people) access insurance
through employer-based plans; another thirty-one percent do so through
Medicare, Medicaid, or other public programs with five percent insured
through private, non-group insurance, and the remaining sixteen percent
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uninsured.107 The Affordable Care Act supports and builds on this publicprivate system. For the uninsured, it facilitates private market mechanisms
through regulation and financing.108 Starting in 2014, the uninsured will be
able, and in fact required, to purchase insurance and will be aided in this
obligation through government subsidies and the development of statelevel exchanges where insurance companies will compete for their
business.109 The ACA also provides incentives to states to expand
Medicaid to reach a greater proportion of the poor.110
In enacting the ACA, Congress anticipated that approximately half of the
population would continue to receive health insurance coverage through
their employers.111 The ACA encourages employers to extend insurance to
their employees through the use of the so-called “employer mandate.”112 If
any large employer—defined as having more than fifty full-time
employees—fails to offer insurance to its employees, and its employees
purchase insurance through the health exchanges with subsidies, it will be
subject to a $2000 tax per full-time employee (minus the first thirty
employees).113 The effective cost of insuring employees will thus be the
total premium minus the penalty, which may encourage employers to keep
or add health insurance over time.114
The ACA also imposes new regulations and consumer protections on
health insurance plans sponsored by employers. Employers that offer
unaffordable or inadequate coverage will pay a $2,500 tax for each full-

107. Emily Smith & Caitlin Stark, By the Numbers: Health Insurance, CNN (June
28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/27/politics/btn-health-care.
108. See generally Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion Under the
Affordable Care Act, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1219 (2013); Mark A. Hall, Approaching
Universal Coverage with Better Safety-Net Programs for the Uninsured, 11 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 9 (2011).
109. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
110. Id.
111. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900_ACAInsuranceCove
rageEffects.pdf (estimating that the number of nonelderly Americans obtaining
insurance through their employer will fluctuate between 154 million people and 167
million people in the next decade).
112. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2006).
113. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(1).
114. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM: SIX YEARS
LATER (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/8311.pdf (“Evidence suggests employers have maintained coverage and
benefit levels since the state’s implementation of health reform.”).
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Of particular
time employee who receives exchange subsidies.115
relevance, all plans must cover preventive care, including women’s
healthcare like contraception, without cost-sharing.116 If its plan does not
meet these requirements, an employer will face a $100 a day tax per
employee and an annual tax assessment.117
The government interest in regulating employer insurance plans is
bolstered by its already substantial role in subsidizing such plans. As
Robert Field observes, “the government shapes, oversees, and indirectly
funds the private market for employer-provided coverage” to an extent that
“means that this product is not offered through a truly private
mechanism.”118 Indeed, the federal government funds employer-sponsored
insurance to the tune of $250 billion a year, representing one-third of the
aggregate amount Americans pay for employer insurance and making it the
third largest government financing program after Medicare and
Medicaid.119
After the ACA is fully implemented, Americans should be able to access
affordable baseline coverage in a relatively uniform way, whether through
employer-provided insurance or insurance purchased through an exchange.
Although large employer-based plans are subject to fewer regulations than
the individual and small group plans in the exchanges, the two are
explicitly linked. Under the ACA, all plans offered in the exchanges must
provide “minimum essential coverage” that is equal to that offered by a
“typical employer plan.”120 The employer-based plan, therefore, acts as the
baseline for what can be considered adequate coverage after healthcare

115.
116.
117.
118.

26 U.S.C. § 4980D.
See supra notes 8-14.
26 U.S.C. § 4980D.
Robert I. Field, Government as the Crucible for Free Market Health Care:
Regulation, Reimbursement, and Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1709, 1712 (2011).
119. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 14 (2013), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxEx
penditures.pdf; see also Christopher J. Conover, Government Share of Healthcare is
Far Bigger Than Advertised, THE AMERICAN, Aug. 2, 2011, available at
http://www.american.com/archive/2011/august/the-government-share-of-health-care-isbigger-than-advertised-health-fact-of-the-week; Field, supra note 114, at 1712 (citing
Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employment-Related Health
Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1568, 1571 (2006)) (indicating that the
tax subsidy amounts to 35.8% of premiums paid to private establishments).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(C) (2006); Ensuring the Affordable Care Act Serves
the American People, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/ehb-2-20-2013.html (last updated Aug. 1,
2013).
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reform.
The regulation of employer-based insurance is characterized by gradual
implementation, rather than immediate change. Although several measures
took effect immediately in 2010, most were rolled out over a period of
years.121 Insurance plans offered to individuals and small groups will cover
preventive services when the new exchanges begin to operate in 2014.
From September 2010, group plans (typically sponsored by employers)
also must offer cost-free preventive care, unless they are grandfathered.122
Those employer-based plans that existed when the ACA was passed may
be grandfathered, that is, exempted from some of the new regulations,
including the preventive care requirement, until the levels of coverage
provided or costs for employees change.123
Granting grandfathered status does not undermine the government’s
interest in comprehensive coverage, including preventive care. In
determining that the government cannot impose the contraception benefit,
some courts contend that, “191 million Americans belong to plans which
may be grandfathered under the ACA.”124 This number represents those
who might theoretically have been covered by grandfathered plans in 2010.
In actuality, however, many plans had already lost this status in 2010.125
By 2012, when the first of these courts made this assertion, 71.5 million
employees were covered by grandfathered plans.126 Grandfathering was
purposely designed to ease the shock of rapid change, with the
understanding that rates of grandfathering would decline each year.127
121. Health Reform Implementation Timeline, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ (last visited June 23, 2013).
122. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(b) (2012).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012); see also Def’s Resp. Br. at 26, Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 405 (2013), aff’d sub nom.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 13-114, 2013 WL 3845365 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013) (“[G]randfathering is not really
a permanent ‘exemption,’ but rather, over the long term, a transition in the marketplace
with respect to . . . the preventive services coverage provision.”).
124. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (2012); Monaghan v.
Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d. 794, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
125. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 190 (2012),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (indicating plans that
could have been eligible for grandfather status either changed the coverage of the plan
or had deductible, co-payment, or employee premium payments that changed too much
to maintain eligibility).
126. Id. (noting that 48% of 149 million covered American workers were in
grandfathered plans).
127. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 127, at 7 (reporting that loss of
grandfathered status among large plans is occurring much faster than anticipated: 58%
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Indeed, by 2013, the number of employees in grandfathered plans had
dropped to approximately 54 million (or thirty-six percent of those who
receive coverage through employment).128 Most plans will eventually
become subject to the preventive services mandate as they make changes
and, thus, lose their grandfathered status.129
With the ACA’s reforms in place, the United States will have a national
health insurance system run largely by, and through, the private sector and
financed through a combination of public, employer, and employee
funding. Employer-based insurance will constitute the mainstay of the near
universal insurance coverage that is the goal of the ACA. Together, private
employer-based insurance, public programs, and the individual exchanges
will ensure a more adequately insured population that is better able to
withstand the shocks of ill health.130 This public-private social insurance
system bears striking resemblance to other social insurance schemes, all of
which have withstood religious liberty challenges, as the next Part shows.
B. The Contraceptive Challenge as Social Insurance Tax Resistance
Our legal system has had little tolerance for objections to social
insurance, especially when those objections come from entities or
employers instead of individuals. In crafting accommodations, legislators
and courts often distinguish being required to contribute to social insurance
from being required to accept or use it.131 Doctrine dictates that
of firms offered a grandfathered plan in 2012, down from 72% in 2011).
128. EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 221, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2013),
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465employer-health-benefits-20131.pdf.
129. Preservation of Right to Maintain Existing Coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a)
(2012).
130. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1596 (2011) (arguing
that these three components will “distribute the risk of future healthcare costs among
the U.S. population according to the share of applicable premiums and taxes paid by
the subpopulations differentially assessed to finance them”).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 n.12 (1982) (“We note that
here the statute compels contributions to the system by way of taxes; it does not compel
anyone to accept benefits.”); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911
F.2d 1203, 1211 n.6 (6th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing employer paying into worker’s
compensation from compelling “an employee of the church who entertains similar
views as a matter of personal conviction to accept any of the benefits conferred by the
workman’s compensation law”); Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of California, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 389, 392-93 (1983) (rejecting objection to student registration fee for health
insurance because students were not forced “to use the student health service programs,
receive pregnancy counseling, have abortions, perform abortions or indorse
abortions”).
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contributions to insurance fall into a zone of limited responsibility and,
therefore, do not significantly burden religious freedom. The challenges to
the contraceptive mandate should be understood within this framework, as
an affront to the administration of the social insurance system for
healthcare.
Until now, courts have consistently dismissed the burden imposed on
religious objectors by insurance programs as both attenuated and justified
by compelling government interests. For example, individuals contested
the ACA’s individual mandate on religious freedom grounds and lost. The
D.C. District Court found it important that the plaintiffs had a choice, much
like employers challenging the employer mandate do here: they could
either pay a tax or purchase the objectionable insurance.132 The court
concluded that “Congress’s compelling interest—reforming the healthcare
market by increasing coverage—applies to Plaintiffs, just as it applies to all
individuals.”133 The court further held that the individual mandate is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest because “[i]n the absence
of the requirement, some individuals would make an economic and
financial decision to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to selfinsure, which increases financial risks to households and medical
providers.”134
Here too, employers have the option of paying a tax instead of offering
insurance. The choice is not binary as challengers to contraceptive
coverage often claim. Employers are not limited to either providing
insurance coverage in violation of conscience or facing ruinous financial
costs.135 Rather, a company has three options: (1) refuse to cover
contraception in an insurance policy and pay a substantial financial cost
(amounting to $100/day per employee and additional taxes); (2) decline to
offer insurance and pay a smaller amount in the form of a tax penalty for
132. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); see also Ahmed v. Univ. of Toledo, 664 F. Supp. 282, 288 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (rejecting foreign students’ challenge to university’s policy of requiring
international students to carry health insurance on the grounds that it was the least
restrictive means to ensure against health costs).
133. See Baker, supra note 130.
134. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 43; see also Liberty Univ. v. Geither, 671 F.3d 391,
450 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (rejecting in brief institutional
challenge that the employer mandate “compels them to violate their ‘sincerely held
religious beliefs against facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting
abortions’ and prohibits the University from ‘providing healthcare choices for
employees that do not conflict with the mission of the University and the core Christian
values under which it and its employees order their day to day lives’”).
135. See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No 1:2-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012) (noting that the plaintiffs frame the choice in this way).
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employees receiving exchange subsidies (a fraction of the cost of insurance
coverage); or (3) offer insurance and cover contraception. Neither of the
latter two options constitutes a substantial financial encumbrance.
Arguably, challengers to the contraception rule object to the payment of
a tax rather than the coverage of contraception. They neither want to pay
the employer mandate taxes, nor do they accept the higher tax
consequences of offering coverage without women’s preventative care.
Their objections appear to fall within the long line of cases rejecting
religious liberty objections to “the payment of taxes or penalties imposed
due to a refusal to pay taxes.”136 In those cases, courts note the importance
of implementing a uniform and mandatory system. This system, they
reason, does not prohibit exemptions, but rather leaves the responsibility
with Congress to create exemptions “given particularly difficult problems
with administration should exceptions on religious grounds be carved out
by the courts.”137
Courts have declined to create religious exemptions to nationwide
programs with respect not only to income taxes, but also to the full range of
insurance programs enforced through the tax code. The leading case is
United States v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court confronted the claim of
an Amish employer to be free from obligations to withhold social security
tax from employees and pay the employer’s share of social security
taxes.138 As is relevant to health insurance regulation, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the government interest is apparent because the social
security system is nationwide and comprehensive.139 Like other insurance
systems, “mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality” of
the program.140 As with the employer mandate under the ACA, the
employer’s role is to contribute funds, collect contributions from
employees, keep records, and transmit payment.141 The Court left the
accommodation of religious objectors to Congress, holding that “[w]hen
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes

136. Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999)
(compiling these cases).
137. Id. at 179.
138. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 252 (1982); see also Droz v. Comm’r, 48
F.3d 1120, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a similar claim under RFRA by looking
to Lee).
139. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 254, 258.
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which are binding on others in that activity.”142
Other employer-based insurance schemes generally have survived
attacks by employers based on religious freedom. Note that cases tend to
involve religiously affiliated non-profit employers, which have a more
substantial claim to religious objection to general statutory employer
obligations than do secular, for-profit corporations.143 Despite this, by and
large, their claims have been unsuccessful.144 For example, in applying
strict scrutiny to an employer’s claim that contributing to unemployment
insurance constituted a substantial burden on free exercise, the Oregon
Supreme Court upheld the unemployment coverage obligation.145 The
court underscored the importance of ensuring against “the cost that
unemployment imposes on the discharged employee and on society.”146
The court acknowledged the tradeoff between wages and insurance, saying,
“[i]n actuality, the unemployment insurance taxes are financial burdens
only in the same sense that the costs of employing paid workers at all are
financial burdens.”147 The fact that employers had to administer the system
in the form of posting notices, filing reports, and keeping records—in
addition to contributing—did not render the burden on religious freedom
unconstitutional. The court found such requirements “no different in
principle from a host of other secular regulatory requirements such as
health inspections of cafeteria workers or kitchens, safety inspections of
school buses, and licensing of drivers.”148
Worker’s compensation is perhaps the most apt comparison to employerbased health insurance. Employers may either purchase private insurance
or self-insure, as with health insurance.149 Worker’s compensation is
142. Id. at 261.
143. See, e.g., Balt. Lutheran High School Ass’n v. Emp’t Sec. Admin., 490 A.2d

701, 710 (Md. 1985) (“[T]here is such an affinity between those taxes and
unemployment insurance taxes as to make Lee dispositive.”).
144. Claims have only succeeded in rare circumstances where organizations can
show they are operated primarily for religious purposes, rather than educational,
administrative, or other purposes. See Mid Vt. Christian School v. Dep’t of Emp’t &
Training, 885 A.2d 1210, 1216 (Vt. 2005) (compiling cases which almost exclusively
involve religious schools).
145. Salem Coll. Acad., Inc. v. Emp. Div., 298 Or. 471 (1985); see also Koolau
Baptist Church v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Rel., 718 P.2d 267 (Haw. 1986) (upholding
application of unemployment compensation requirements to religiously affiliated
school as an insubstantial burden on religion).
146. Salem Coll. Acad., Inc., 298 Or. at 486.
147. Id.
148. Balt. Lutheran, 490 A.2d at 713.
149. PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 7582 (1998). In many states, there is a public option as well, with the state serving as
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financed by premiums collected from employers, and “this cost is
commonly understood to be borne in all or large part by employees in the
form of foregone wages.”150 It too is a form of health insurance, ensuring
that risks of healthcare costs attributable to occupational injury and illness
are distributed across workers.151 Indeed, some anticipate that once the
reforms of the Affordable Care Act are fully implemented, “workers’
compensation health benefits may be merged over time into the general
employment-based health benefit system.”152
Like other social insurance programs, worker’s compensation has
withstood repeated claims that it impinges on the religious liberty of
religious employers. In considering one such case, the Sixth Circuit noted
the government’s compelling interests in the solvency of the insurance
system and the protection of workers and their dependents.153 Given these
interests, the court concluded, as have others, that “where [religious] beliefs
clash with important state interests in the welfare of others, accommodation
is not constitutionally mandated.”154
Of course, many in this long line of cases involve objections to any
involvement in social insurance.
By contrast, challengers to the
contraception benefit would say that they actually seek to provide
insurance and only object to contraception. At heart, however, as one
judge stated, the objection strikes at the requirement “to fund a health
payer. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.10 (1984).
150. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1594 (2011); see also
Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided
Insurance: Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance 4, 4 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3557, Dec. 1990) (“Empirical analysis of two
data sets suggest that changes in employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance
are largely shifted to employees in the form of lower wages.”); W. Kip Viscusi &
Michael J. Moore, Workers’ Compensation: Wage Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and
the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249, 249 (1987) (noting research
showing that “workers are willing to trade off additional wage compensation for higher
workers’ compensation benefits”).
151. Gruber & Krueger, supra note 150, at 5 (“Workers’ compensation laws require
employers to secure insurance to provide a minimum level of cash payments and
medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries and illnesses.”).
152. Baker, supra note 150, at 1595.
153. See South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th
Cir. 1990).
154. Id. at 1208, 1211; see also Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Labor &
Ind., 291 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Mont. 2012) (rejecting objections of colony of Anabaptists
organized as a religious corporation to participating in worker’s compensation scheme);
Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982) (rejecting school’s challenge to maintaining worker’s compensation insurance).
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insurance plan that covers many medical services, not just
contraception.”155 Moreover, other challenges to social insurance schemes
could be characterized as focused on a particular regulation or segment of
the insurance scheme. For example, the Amish employer in Lee also
sought exemption because he objected to the particular structure mandated
by legislation, rather than the notion of social assistance itself.156 The
Amish simply demand a right to provide for their own in a way that does
not comply with federal regulations. Similarly, objectors to income taxes
rarely resist the entirety of the tax system.157 Any particular individual
claim might not be onerous or intrusive on the government interest.
Nonetheless, courts recognize that accommodating individual objections to
specific budget items would destroy the system as a whole.158
Prior cases presented arguments that are virtually identical to those
raised against the contraception benefit, claiming that paying into an
insurance plan that covers objectionable medical care imposes a substantial
burden on religion. Consider Goehring v. Brophy where students at a
public university objected to paying student fees to the university health
insurance system because it covered abortion.159 The Ninth Circuit rejected
the students’ RFRA claims and reasoned that “the fiscal vitality of the
University’s fee system would be undermined if the plaintiffs in the present
case were exempted from paying a portion of their student registration fee
on free exercise grounds. Mandatory uniform participation by every

155. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
156. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“The Amish believe that there

is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of
assistance contemplated by the social security system.”); see also Bethel Baptist
Church v. United States, 822 F.2d 1334, 1336 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Bethel Baptist’s
members oppose any governmental attempt to assume their religious responsibility of
self-care or to dictate the means by which the Church shall discharge its provisional
responsibilities to its members. In accordance with these beliefs, Bethel Baptist has
since 1978 maintained its own private social program for care of employees.”).
157. See, e.g., Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969) (reviewing
the claim of federal income tax payers seeking refunds for portion of taxes that went to
finance war because “[t]o finance and pay for an activity is to participate in it” and they
“conscientiously object to the war in Viet-Nam and claim exemption from participation
in these military activities”); Crowe v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766, 767
(8th Cir. 1968) (hearing a claim of a taxpayer objecting to income taxes that
“contribute to the welfare of people who made no effort to support themselves”).
158. See Autenrieth, 418 F.2d at 588-89 (“If every citizen could refuse to pay all or
part of his taxes because he disapproved of the government’s use of the money, on
religious grounds, the ability of the government to function could be impaired or even
destroyed.”).
159. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996).
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student is essential to the insurance system’s survival.”160 Similar student
claims have failed elsewhere.161
Courts have disallowed other challenges to regulating the structure of
insurance. A religiously affiliated school, for example, was prohibited
from limiting health insurance benefits to employees who are the “head of
the household,” defined by the school based on its religious teachings to
exclude married women.162 The highest courts of New York and
California, two of the most populous states, both upheld the application of
state contraceptive coverage mandates to religious organizations, including
Catholic Charities.163 The Supreme Court of California determined that an
exemption from contraceptive coverage “sacrifices the affected women’s
interest in receiving equitable treatment with respect to health benefits.”164
Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that no precedent existed for
exempting “a religious objector from the operation of a neutral, generally
applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would
detrimentally affect the rights of third parties.”165
C. The Religious Liberty Analysis in the Context of Compelling Interests in
a National Health Insurance Scheme
As current litigation percolates through the legal system, courts should
consider the contraception benefit within the ACA’s overarching goal of
access to affordable, standardized health insurance in a non-discriminatory
way. Due to the wage-insurance tradeoff, employer-based health insurance
functions more like wages to compensate the employee than like a gift, or
freestanding payment, from the employer. Any burden on the corporation
or its owners is, therefore, mitigated. Employees’ access to or use of
unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, social security, vacation
days, or health insurance cannot substantially burden their employers.
Moreover, the contraception benefit rule serves four compelling
government interests. First, compliance with the ACA’s comprehensive
health insurance scheme, like other social insurance programs, is a
160. Id. at 1301.
161. Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 392-93 (1983)

(resisting payment of student registration fee for student insurance that covered
abortion or pregnancy-related counseling).
162. E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986).
163. See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 522
(2006); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 527, 566
(2004) (holding that state contraceptive mandate withstood both the rational basis and
strict scrutiny constitutional tests).
164. See Erzinger, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1295.
165. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 32 Cal. 4th at 564-65.
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compelling governmental interest. The government’s interest in these
programs cannot be attained without widespread participation and
compliance with this regulation. The employer mandate—which functions
as an incentive for employers to offer an adequate baseline level of
insurance that reaches preventive care—is the least restrictive means to
accomplish this goal.
Second, increased insurance coverage for contraceptive care furthers
national interests in public health. In the United States, unintended
pregnancy poses a serious public health problem. Nearly half of
pregnancies are unintended, a much higher rate than in comparable
countries, due in part to barriers to contraceptive use.166 Unintended
pregnancy, in turn, has adverse health consequences for both women and
their children.167
Third, ensuring women’s access to preventive services addresses the
healthcare inequities that confront women in the United States. Congress
responded to evidence that women pay sixty-eight percent more in out-ofpocket health costs as compared to men, in large part because they bear the
costs of contraception and reproduction.168 Cost, however, was not the
only concern. Enhancing women’s control over their reproductive health
was understood to allow women to pursue their professional and
educational ambitions instead of having children when they are not
ready.169
166. Susheela Singh, Gilda Sedgh & Rubina Hussain, Unintended Pregnancy:
Worldwide Levels, Trends, and Outcomes, 41 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 241, 245 (2010) (“The
unintended pregnancy rate in 2008 in North America is much higher than those of
Northern, Southern, and Western Europe”—48% as compared to 29-36%); Lawrence
B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Incidence and
Disparities, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 484 (2011) (“[R]educing the unintended
pregnancy rate requires that we focus on increasing and improving contraceptive use
among women and couples who want to avoid pregnancy. Increased use of long-acting
and cost-effective contraceptive methods such as the intrauterine device (IUD) could
play an important role in such an effort.”).
167. See generally Jessica D. Gipson, Michael A. Koenig & Michelle J. Hindin, The
Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and Parental Health: A Review of
the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18 (2008).
168. Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance
Coverage of Contraception, 1 GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL. 5, 5 (1998).
169. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights:
Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 819
(2007) (“Control over whether and when to give birth is practically important to
women for reasons inflected with gender-justice concern: it crucially affects women’s
health and sexual freedom, their ability to enter and end relationships, their education
and job training, their ability to provide for their families, and their ability to negotiate
work-family conflicts . . . .”).
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Fourth, the contraceptive benefit advances a thus-far-unaddressed
compelling interest in religious liberty. In analyzing and accepting RFRA
claims against contraceptive coverage, courts understand religious liberty
only to lie with the challengers. This obscures the fact that the
contraceptive rule permits each employee to make his or her own moral
decisions about reproduction and health. If the contraceptive challengers
are successful, their employees effectively will not be able to access
insurance that covers contraception. They will not be eligible for subsidies
for the exchanges. Nor can they purchase insurance with pre-tax dollars,
whereas premium payments through employment-sponsored insurance
receive favorable tax treatment.170 For this group of employees, private
insurance, in practice, will continue to be available almost exclusively
through employment,171 much like social security, worker’s compensation,
and unemployment insurance. Due to these constraints, the contraceptive
coverage mandate ensures that each employee (and his or her partners and
dependents) can make decisions about contraceptive use based on his or her
moral beliefs. High costs and lack of coverage will no longer impede their
ability to live out their own conception of the moral life.172
In sharp contrast, legal acceptance of corporate conscience as an excuse
for regulatory non-compliance subordinates the beliefs of employees to the
owners of the corporation. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
exempting an employer from worker-protective statutes “operates to
impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”173 Even with
regard to religiously affiliated employers engaged in commerce, courts
have been disquieted by this risk. In reviewing its state contraceptive
benefit, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “many of plaintiffs’

170. Mark A. Hall, Christie L. Hager & David Orentlicher, Using Payroll
Deduction to Shelter Individual Health Insurance from Income Tax, 46 HEALTH SERV.
RES. 348, 349 (2011).
171. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 190
(2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (“Employers are the
principal source of health insurance in the United States, providing health benefits for
about 149 million nonelderly people in America.”).
172. Simply making contraception available through the market was insufficient to
accomplish these goals. More than half of all women between the ages of 18 and 34
have been unable to afford birth control, and many more women forego devices that are
cost-effective in the long term, like intrauterine devices, because of the high up-front
cost. Survey: Nearly Three in Four Voters in America Support Fully Covering
Prescription Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Oct. 2010),
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/survey-nearlythree-four-voters-america-support-fully-covering-prescription-birth-control-33863.htm.
173. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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employees do not share their religious beliefs” and decided that “when a
religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least to some
degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect those
employees’ legitimate interests in doing what their own beliefs permit.”174
This precedent should suggest to courts that the strong public interest in
“ensuring equal protection of the laws and protection of First Amendment
liberties”175 rests, in these cases, with the government.
There is no viable less restrictive means to carry out these compelling
goals. Challengers demand that the government directly provide and pay
for contraception for employees whose employers block access to
contraception through employer-based insurance. Alternately, they insist
that the accommodation for religious affiliated non-profits be extended to
secular, for-profit businesses. As previous religious liberty challenges to
social insurance show, precedent supports neither claim. Indubitably, the
government could directly finance and deliver social security, worker’s
compensation, unemployment insurance, and health insurance through
general revenue, thus ensuring no burden on employers. But the
Constitution does not so require. Similarly, the mere existence of
exemptions for religious employers or non-profits does not require
expanded accommodation.
Situating the contraception benefit within the doctrinal framework of
social insurance makes clear that religious challenges by employers should
be rejected. As courts have previously held, any accommodation of
religious objections to social insurance is the responsibility of other
branches. In this instance, the Executive branch has accommodated
religiously affiliated organizations and religious employers, while ensuring
compelling interests in comprehensive social insurance, public health,
gender equality, and religious freedom are nonetheless advanced.
V. THE IMPACT ON HEALTH REFORM AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
If the challenges to the contraceptive mandate succeed on the grounds of
a business interest in religious observance, it will send shock waves far
beyond contraception. Most immediately, it will destabilize the reforms of
the ACA. The rights of employees generally, and of women in particular,
174. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y.
2006); see also South Ridge Baptist Church v. Ind. Comm’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203,
1211 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[T]o preclude some other employee not exercising such belief
from the benefits of [worker’s compensation] merely because the Church itself opposes
them or prefers to provide for them in a different manner, could not escape the
prospective danger of denying that employee the equal protection of the state’s law
merely because of the personal religious beliefs of his employer.”).
175. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
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will be at risk.
As courts engage in an expansion of corporate rights unprecedented in
constitutional and statutory precedent, they act as though contraception is
uniquely morally objectionable. In crafting the contraception benefit rule,
separate from other benefits that must be covered by employer-based
insurance plans, the government effectively did so as well. Under the rule,
religious employers will only be exempted and religious organizations only
accommodated with regard to contraception. An employer will not, for
instance, be granted regulatory accommodation of its resistance to other
required women’s preventive services, such as counseling on sexually
transmitted diseases.
If an employer’s free exercise is unconstitutionally burdened by the
regulation of health insurance coverage, employers could successfully
dispute any mandated benefits. For example, employers might contest
coverage of sexually transmitted infection counseling and testing, which
the ACA also requires, on the ground that only marital sex is moral.
Unmarried pregnant women might similarly be denied mandated prenatal
care. Many employers might oppose covering the HPV vaccine based on
the incorrect belief that it causes promiscuity176—just as some employers
today maintain that emergency contraception causes abortion despite all
scientific evidence to the contrary.177
Although objections might be expected to center around reproductive
and sexual health,178 required preventive care includes other services

176. See, e.g., Alexandra Sifferlin, Cancer Rates Dropping, But Not for All Tumor
Types, TIME (Jan. 8, 2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/01/08/cancer-ratesdropping-but-not-for-all-tumor-types/ (discussing parents’ objections to the so-called
“promiscuity vaccine”); Robert A. Bednarczyk et al., Sexual Activity-Related Outcomes
After Human Papillomavirus Vaccination of 11 to 12 Year Olds, 130 PEDIATRICS 798,
805 (2012) (showing no increase in promiscuity three years after HPV vaccination).
177. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *4 (7th Cir.
Dec. 28, 2012) (describing the plaintiffs’ contention that certain drugs and devices such
as the “morning-after pill,” “Plan B,” and “Ella” come within the Mandate’s and
HRSA’s definition of “Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive
methods” despite their “known abortifacient mechanisms of action”); Alastair J.J.
Wood, Jeffery M. Drazen & Michael F. Green, The Politics of Emergency
Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (2012) (“Levonorgestril [Plan B] does
not cause abortion; it does not terminate an established pregnancy.”); Sheri A. Hild et
al., CDB-2914: Anti-Progestational/Anti-Glucocorticoid Profile and Post-Coital AntiFertility Activity in Rats and Rabbits, 15 HUM. REPROD. 822, 830 (2000) (showing that
ulipristal [Ella] has the potential to prohibit implantation in rats and rabbits but finding
no evidence of terminating an existing pregnancy).
178. See Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for
Pregnancy Discrimination Claims and Employees’ Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 47, 73 (2013) (noting that “questions of sexuality and reproduction—
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contested by some religions, such as depression screening and vaccination
for adults and children. As Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit said in her
dissent,
[I]f an employer has this right [with regard to contraception], it is not
clear to me what limits there might be on the ability to limit the
insurance coverage the employer provides to its employees, for any
number of medical services (or decisions to use particular medical
services in particular circumstances) might be inconsistent with an
employer’s (or its individual owners’) individual religious beliefs.179

Employers could intrude on their employees’ privacy in order, for instance,
to ensure that sexual assault victims, but no other women, have insurance
coverage for emergency contraception.
Objections to required services would seemingly not be limited to
employers. Insurance companies, religiously affiliated and secular, would
appear to have a similar ability to raise religious freedom as a shield against
the ACA’s insurance regulations. Indeed, they play a much more direct
role in the financing and provision of contraception than do employers.
Such claims seem farfetched, but in some states, insurance companies have
already demanded religious exemptions from state contraceptive coverage
regulations.
In general, if secular employers succeed in contesting the contraception
mandate, it will open the door to objections to other regulations,
undermining gender equality and religious freedom in workplaces of all
kinds. Religiously affiliated commercial actors already assert rights to defy
health and safety laws, pay women less, and fire pregnant women.180 It
would be a short step from recognizing that for-profit, secular employers
can deny employees the use of benefits to purchase contested medical care,
and allowing them to fire employees for using such medical care.181 That,

particularly women’s sexuality and reproduction—are often conflated with ‘moral’ or
‘religious’ issues”).
179. Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *7.
180. See Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr. v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 243-44 (4th
Cir. 1984) (noting that health and safety regulations applicable to sectarian child care
center do not burden free exercise rights); Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 303-05 (1985) (applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to a non-profit religious
organization does not violate the free exercise clause); Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 573 F. Supp. 320, 325 (W.D. Va. 1983) (challenging the application of Fair
Labor Standards Act minimum wage and equal pay provisions).
181. See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (noting
the government argument that accepting challengers’ claims “would widen
enormously . . . the scope of RFRA’s protection, providing owners of secular, for-profit
companies the power currently reserved for religious organizations under Title VII to
claim religion-grounded exceptions to federal laws”).
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in fact, is precisely what we see in the context of religiously affiliated
organizations. For example, a Catholic-affiliated school terminated a lay
teacher for requesting time off for in vitro fertilization treatment on the
basis that IVF “is an intrinsic evil . . . which means no circumstances can
justify it.”182 In line with several churches, some for-profit employers
might determine that women should be paid less based on the belief that
men are the heads of households.183
In accepting that a corporation can successfully assert free exercise
against the contraceptive mandate, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit recognized the far-reaching implications of corporate conscience.
The plurality opinion identified Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act as
potential targets of future challenges.184 As Judge Briscoe noted in the
dissent,
[I]f all it takes for a corporation to be categorized as a ‘faith based
business’ for purposes of RFRA is a combination of a general religious
statement in the corporation’s statement of purpose and more specific
religious beliefs on the part of the corporation’s founders or owners, the
majority’s holding will have, intentionally or unwittingly, opened the
floodgates to RFRA litigation challenging any number of federal statutes
that govern corporate affairs.185

Ultimately, courts should be wary of religious freedom claims from forprofit, secular corporations. Current decisions characterizing the regulation
of employment benefits as a substantial and unjustified burden on religious
freedom on employers would have potentially radical consequences for
employment regulation. Acceptance of corporate conscience would invite
challenges to health, safety, and nondiscrimination regulations in the
workplace and beyond.186 It would put the institution in a legally superior

182. Waters, supra note 177, at 64 (discussing Herx v. Diocese of Fort WayneSouth Bend, No. 1:12-cv-00122, 2012 WL 3870528 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2012)); see
also Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., 680 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2012)
(describing that female teacher was terminated from her position at a “nondenominational Christian school” because she had become pregnant prior to her
marriage).
183. See generally Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.
1990); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v.
Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Russell v. Belmont
Coll., 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
184. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2013 WL 3216103, *9*13 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013).
185. Id. at *51 (Briscoe, J., concurring and dissenting).
186. In a forthcoming paper, I refer to this development as “Free Exercise
Lochnerism,” which revives business attacks on the regulatory state through religious
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position to the individual and undermine the religious pluralism that we
value in commercial and public life.
CONCLUSION
In litigation against the contraception benefit, courts have begun to
accept a doctrine of corporate conscience. In so doing, they ascribe
religious liberty to secular, for-profit businesses. As I have argued here,
their analysis has four fundamental flaws. First, it either grants directly to a
legal fiction an inherently human characteristic or indirectly transfers
shareholders’ beliefs to the corporation, defying a central premise of
corporate law, that is, that corporations are separate from their owners and
have different rights and obligations. Courts have eluded difficult
corporate law, religious liberty, and employment law questions that ensue.
Second, the analysis ignores the structure and function of employer-based
insurance after the Affordable Care Act. Looking more deeply at the wagebenefit tradeoff informs the alleged responsibility of the employer for the
use or purchase of contraception. Third, a further examination of
employer-based insurance demonstrates that it shares characteristics with
other social insurance schemes, like worker’s compensation and
unemployment insurance, all of which have withstood religious liberty
challenges. Finally, any doctrine of corporate conscience risks health
insurance coverage, safety regulations, and gender equality in workplaces
of all kinds to the detriment of all employees.

liberty arguments.
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